

Science and Technology Facilities Council

IRIS Security Workshop

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- This workshop is the continuation of a long history of security workshops held at HEPSYSMAN meetings
- Held almost every year around June, typically one day meeting
 - Forensics training, topics of special interest
- Last year, spent the morning on procedures and the afternoon on digital forensics
- This year, spread workshops throughout the year via Zoom



Logistics

- Aim to have a 15-20 minute break around 3.20pm, and finish by 5pm
- Ideally keep cameras on while participating in discussion, but as you like
- We will not be recording this session: identify some note takers
- Not anticipating particularly sensitive discussions
 - but this is a security meeting so treat information appropriately
- Any issues please use the chat, either to everyone or me privately



Plan for today

Before coffee

- Look at operational security structures for GridPP and IRIS
 - Some material GridPP specific, but consider what we need for IRIS
- Discuss security procedures at our sites/facilities
- Continuous process plan to do this yearly
 - Both opportunity to discuss, and build plans for the future



Plan for today

• After coffee

- Operational security tools
 - What do people use?
 - What would people like to use?
 - How can the team help?
- Topics for the future



EGI CSIRT + SVG

- Specifically applicable to GridPP
 - For IRIS, overlap via IRIS Security Team
- EGI CSIRT
 - Incident Response
 - Monitoring
 - Drills
 - Training
- EGI SVG: Software Vulnerability Group



Incident response

- Incident response for GridPP ultimately coordinated by EGI CSIRT Incident Response Task Force (IRTF)
- IRTF on duty rota currently comprises NGI Security Officers for
 - CERN
 - NGI_NL
 - NGI_CZ
 - NGI_SI
 - NGI_IBERGRID
 - NGI_UK



IRTF: Roles and responsibilities

- Incident coordination
- Critical vulnerability tracking
 - On duty officer raises a ticket, followed up by EGI Ops
- Communication Challenges
- Service Security Challenges
- Liaison with other CSIRTs



IRTF: Monitoring

- Security dashboard
 - https://operations-portal.egi.eu
- Combines results from pakiti (sites should see their own results)
 - https://pakiti.egi.eu
- and secmon (accessible by NGI security officers)
 - Checks possible mitigations
- Pakiti gives patch status
- Secmon uses Nagios to check for mitigations (ARGO)
 - Combined result means pakiti is not the whole story



Purpose of the EGI Software Vulnerability Group (SVG)

• "To minimize the risk to the infrastructure arising from software vulnerabilities"

- To Prevent Security Incidents
- SVG has been handling software vulnerabilities in EGI and its predecessors for more than a decade.
- Started with Grid Middleware as no-one was handling these, then evolved to handle any vulnerabilities relevant to the EGI distributed infrastructure



EGI SVG basic procedure

- Anyone may report a vulnerability to report-vulnerability@egi.eu
- If it has not been announced as fixed by the provider, SVG contacts the software provider
- If relevant to EGI the risk in the EGI environment is assessed, and put in 1 of 4 categories 'Critical', 'High', 'Moderate' or 'Low'
- If it has not been fixed, Target Date (TD) for resolution is set 'High' 6 weeks, 'Moderate' 4 months, 'Low' 1 year



EGI SVG basic procedure

- Advisory is issued by SVG
 - If the issue is 'Critical' or 'High' in the EGI infrastructure
 - When the vulnerability is fixed if EGI SVG is the main handler of vulnerabilities for this software, or software is in EGI Repository regardless of the risk.
 - If we think there is a good reason to issue an advisory to the sites
- Priority given to Critical vulnerabilities handle within 1 day



Now increased scope and evolving procedure

- The EOSC catalogue is a catalogue of services available to researchers
 - <u>https://marketplace.eosc-portal.eu/</u>
- Scope is now evolving to include the EOSC hub Portfolio
 - Common services like accounting, AAI, Marketplace software itself
 - But NOT the 100s of other service in the catalogue
- Procedure changing due to the increased inhomogeneity of services and proliferation of software and services as well as increased scope
- Setting up 'Deployment Expert Group' to cope with this



Deployment Expert Group (DEG)

- SVG members cannot be expert in all software and services
 - Need to call on others who select, configure, and deploy services
- Deployment expert group's job is to:--
 - Look out for vulnerabilities in software they deploy and report them
 - Respond when asked 'Is this software in scope? Do you use it?
 - Volunteer to help investigate and risk assess a vulnerability when they have expertise
- Scope will also depend on participation in the DEG.



EGI CSIRT/SVG + IRIS

- EGI Broadcasts are sent during incidents and with advisories about vulnerabilities
- Agreement with EGI CSIRT to share incident indicators with IRIS Security
 Team
 - Lets us check for impact across IRIS
 - Also share back from IRIS to EGI CSIRT to support global incident response
- Can also pass on vulnerabilities
 - May not always have same impact for all IRIS sites



IRIS Security Team: security@iris.ac.uk

- Builds from existing team supporting operational security in GridPP and helping coordinate incident response for the UK for incidents coordinated by EGI CSIRT
- Now contains representatives from Grid/HPC/Cloud across IRIS
 - At least two from each by design
 - CSIRT Code of Practice to affirm acceptance of TLP labels
- Primary role is to coordinate incident response and share security information across IRIS
 - Already discussed setting up secure channels, in progress
 - Coordinate with other CSIRTs, particularly (inter)national Janet CSIRT and EGI CSIRT



IRIS Security Team: security@iris.ac.uk

- Current and future work
 - Training events
 - Security challenges: communications, traceability and service challenges are possible
 - Start with communications challenge in due course
- What can the team, being distributed, do to help secure IRIS?
 - Monitoring
 - Tools
 - (all backed by IRIS-IAM)



Before coffee



Before coffee

- Talk about procedures
- Service providers should know what to do in case of a security incident
- Opportunity to discuss what we have in place + and what we need
- If we come out of this with sites having some action items, that's great!
- Also explore what we specifically need in IRIS as we grow our capability
 - Already talking about secure channels
 - What about vulnerability assessments?



Before coffee: mini tabletop

- One of the central security teams reports unusual network traffic to you.
 - What do you do?
 - Who do you talk to?
 - Do you have a plan in place?
- Discuss!



After coffee



After coffee: Operational Security Tools

• Time for a poll!

- Yes: this is a security officer asking you to enter a link $\ensuremath{\textcircled{\odot}}$

<u>http://etc.ch/DGhX</u>





After coffee: Operational Security Tools

- Ongoing discussion (held over from last Security Workshop)
- What tools should sites have in place?
 - Network tools
 - Scanning
 - Host based tools
 - Central logging
 - Threat intelligence (threat feeds/systems that monitor your traffic)
- Other operational security topics for today



Topics for next workshop

- Options for next time
- Follow-up/more detail from today
- Forensics
- Tabletop exercise

